The Concepts of Space in Plotinus by Baracat Jr., José Carlos
33
The Concepts of Space in Plotinus
José C. Baracat Jr.
baracatjr@hotmail.com
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), Porto Alegre, Brasil
resumo O objetivo deste artigo é recolher passagens das Enéadas que contêm informação 
relevante para a investigação dos conceitos de espaço/lugar em Plotino. Espero poder in-
dicar, depois disso, que pelo menos três noções de espaço/lugar coexistem na filosofia de 
Plotino: i) Plotino distingue espaço e matéria, mas dessa distinção não fica claro a) se o 
espaço subsiste à parte dos corpos, ou b) se ele é apenas um relativo, ou c) se ele é uma 
das propriedades dos corpos e, neste caso, se ele tem algum tipo de modelo inteligível; 
iii) e, em várias passagens, Plotino formula uma versão platônica e imaterial do conceito 
estoico de espaço, afirmando que entes imateriais não estão num lugar, de modo que o 
corpo não é o lugar da alma, mas antes é a alma o lugar do corpo.
palavras-chave Plotino (c. 205-270); neoplatonismo; filosofia antiga; espaço; lugar; matéria
I
When a philosopher devotes his genius and a considerable amount of 
his energy to meditating on the question of time, one expects him to 
dedicate a similar effort to that of space or place too.1 Not only Aristotle, 
Leibniz, Newton, and Kant have done that in a paradigmatic way: within 
the Neoplatonic tradition, Iamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus, Damascius, 
Simplicius, and Philoponus may be said to have felt that a theory of space 
is as essential as a theory of time.
This is not Plotinus’ case, however. He wrote an entire treatise to 
elucidate the natures of eternity and time (III. 7 [45]), in which he 
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presents one of the most original and influential theories in the Western 
tradition. The theory exposed in that treatise is not only vigorous; it is 
also coherent with the entirety of the Plotinian metaphysics and does not 
differ significantly from other brief accounts of eternity and time given 
by Plotinus in other treatises.2 
On the other hand, if we try to unearth what Plotinus thought about 
space, we find serious difficulties. For he has not written any substantial 
exposition of his concept of space, but only terse incidental remarks elicited 
by the speculation about other themes such as the soul’s progression, 
matter, bodies, and the sensible world. Of course these themes would be 
the perfect occasion to discuss the concept of space, but Plotinus never 
actually develops one.
Besides being terse and incidental, Plotinus’ remarks on space do not 
seem to form a coherent line of thought or to suggest a harmonic whole 
at first sight, so that we would at least be able, after gathering them, to 
catch a glimpse of a theory. As a matter of fact, passages of treatises II. 4 
[12], III. 6 [26], IV. 3 [27], and VI. 3 [44], for instance, seem to conflict 
with each other.
The absence of a substantial discussion of the concept of space may 
be a strong indication that Plotinus did not regard it an important, urgent 
issue. Only such possible unimportance, more than the lack of material, 
would justify the inexistence – to my knowledge – of scholarly analyses 
of Plotinus’ concept of space. The few considerations I am aware of are 
almost as terse and incidental as Plotinus’ statements; and they do not take 
into account the conflicting passages, but usually stick to a few harmonic 
passages, thus giving us the misleading impression that Plotinus did have 
a theory of space – and only one theory.
As we will see, at least three notions of space can be detected in 
the Enneads. i) In II. 4 [12] and VI. 6 [36], Plotinus clearly distinguishes 
space and matter; from this distinction, however, it does not become 
clear a) whether space has some degree of subsistence apart from bodies; 
or b) whether it is nothing but a relative, some sort of mental category 
we employ to analyze the sensible world; or c) whether it is one of 
the properties of bodies and, in this case, whether it has an intelligible 
model or counterpart, as time is an “image of eternity” ii) In III. 6 [26], 
on the other hand, we find elements to think that Plotinus identified 
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space with matter in a certain sense. iii) And we find still another sense 
of space in the Enneads: in numerous passages (e.g. in IV. 3 [27] and III. 
7 [45]), Plotinus formulates an immaterial, Platonic, version of the Stoic 
concept of space, asserting that immaterial beings are not in place, so 
that body is not the soul’s place, but rather soul is the place of body – 
and, consequently, the intellect is the place the soul, while the place of 
intellect is “something else”
The aim of this article, therefore, is to collect passages from the Enneads 
that contain relevant information for the investigation of the concept (or 
rather concepts) of space in Plotinus. I hope this paper can indicate, after 
collating such passages, that the three senses of space mentioned above 
can coexist in Plotinus’ metaphysics. I believe Plotinus holds that space is 
and is not matter. Named hypodokhé, khóra, and also tópos, matter is space 
in the sense of being an “absolute” space, the space where bodies and the 
sensible world can gain existence. This sense does not preclude the second 
one: tópos –but never khóra – is something different from matter, although 
it is impossible to determine whether it subsists, whether it is a relative, or 
a quality of bodies. The third sense could be regarded as metaphorical, but 
it should not be dismissed for this reason; soul as a place for body – i.e. the 
corporeal being in the incorporeal – is an important and recurrent notion 
in Plotinus, and it seems to be a rework of the Stoic concept of space and 
a direct response to it as well.
II
In an article of mine about time I wrote: “time and space (the sensible 
realm) were produced by soul at the same moment and by the same 
activity.”3 Paraphrasing Plotinus (III. 7 [45] 1. 3-12), I had the confidence 
of the ignorant who thinks he knows something until he is asked about 
it. I was sure that reflecting on space in more or less the same terms of 
reflecting on time would be fruitful. Since the sensible world is in space 
and in time, and the sensible world is produced by soul, and time is an 
activity of soul, it seemed a logical consequence that space too is some 
sort of product of soul and that it comes into existence together with 
time and the sensible world.
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When I considered some my questions about Plotinus’ concept of 
time to be solved, I thought I should turn to the concept of space. This 
was the exact moment I realized that I knew absolutely nothing about it 
and that the topic is actually far more complex than I believed. As we all, 
including Plotinus, usually do, I began to gather what great scholars had 
said about the topic, and discovered that they had not said much.
The obvious works to start with are Max Jammer’s Concepts of Space, 
Richard Sorabji’s Matter, Space and Motion, and Shmuel Sambursky’s The 
Concept of Place in Late Neoplatonism.4 The first says absolutely nothing 
about Plotinus; the second mentions en passant that Plotinus reverts the 
expected relation of soul and body by making body to be in soul, soul in 
intellect, and intellect in something else (p. 206). Sambursky, for his turn, 
says a little more, but here is exactly where some of our problems begin:
“The asymmetry in the levels of reality of space and time, mentioned 
above [on p. 13] in connection with Plato’s cosmology, was finally 
eliminated by Plotinus. He expressly distinguished between physical space, 
which is the receptacle of matter and thus has a lower rank than the matter 
and bodies in it, and intelligible space, which is the very principle and 
source of the Soul and the Intellect. Thus a hypostatic equality was 
established between intelligible space and intelligible time…Since every 
hypostatic level participates to some extent in that above it, it follows 
that physical space is endowed with some of the properties of the 
intelligible space, though to a restricted degree only” (1982, p. 15-16, 
italics mine).
The asymmetry mentioned by Sambursky is that, for Plato, space (here 
khóra) and time rank on different levels of reality; time is the “moving 
image of eternity”, and thus belongs to the sensible realm, the domain 
of becoming; space, for its turn, is “the nurse of all becoming”, being an 
intermediary between being and becoming, therefore above time; time is 
generated, space is eternal (Timaeus, 47e-52d)5. Sambursky quotes (p. 38)
only two passages to illustrate Plotinus’ concept of space and to show how 
he has eliminated Plato’s asymmetry:
1) II. 4 [12] 12. 11-13: “but place is posterior to matter and bodies, so 
that bodies would need matter before they need place” (ὁ δὲ τόπος ὕστερος 
τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῶν σωμάτων, ὥστε πρότερον ἂν δέοιτο τὰ σώματα ὕλης).6,7
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2) II. 5 [25] 3. 39-40: “the place there [i.e. in the intelligible world], 
then, is a place of life and the origin and spring of true soul and intellect” 
(ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐκεῖ τόπος ἐστὶ ζωῆς καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ ἀληθοῦς ψυχῆς τε καὶ νοῦ).
From the first passage Sambursky concludes that space is different 
from and posterior to matter, what makes space inferior to matter in a 
Plotinian frame of mind. From the second passage he understands that 
Plotinus literally states the existence of an intelligible space8 which is not 
a mental reality, but an intelligible principle prior to the soul and to the 
intellect. 9 But can it be concluded from them that Plotinus has expressly 
eliminated the asymmetry that existed in Plato? I do not think so.
Firstly, it seems to me that Plotinus is not as coherent as it Sambursky 
makes us believe when he does not take into account important passages 
of IV. 3 [27] and VI. 3 [44] that I will explore later. Secondly, things become 
really confusing when he says that space has a lower rank than matter, and 
that it is the “receptacle of matter”. If matter for Plotinus is the very last level 
of reality, lacking being and all determination implied by it – for matter is 
deprived of thought, of virtue, of beauty, of strength, of shape, of form, of 
quality (II. 4 [12] 16. 21-23), and deprived of course of size (mégethos; II. 4 [12] 
8. 11) –, how can something be even lower than it? “Receptacle of matter” 
therefore is an expression wholly deprived of sense in Plotinus’ metaphysics. 
Sambursky says that because he interprets the hýsteron (“posterior”) of 
passage the first passage as “inferior”. The word usually does have this sense 
in Plotinus’ metaphysics, but it cannot be its meaning here: bodies also are 
logically posterior to matter, since they are the composite of matter and 
form, but they are not ontologically inferior to it, since they have some 
intelligibility and determination (II. 4 [12] 12. 34-35; II. 7 [37] 3).10 
Plotinus holds that matter does exist, even though it is absolute “non-
being”(II. 4 [12] 16. 1-4; III. 6 [26] 7. 12-13; III. 6 [26] 13. 21-29). So, if 
space exists at all, it cannot be inferior to matter as Sambursky thinks. It 
can be “posterior” and “later” in the timeless order of production, but it 
cannot be inferior in the same sense that, for instance, the soul is posterior, 
later, and also inferior to the intellect, its principle; and the reason for this 
is that there is nothing below matter, so that the minimum for space to 
be is at least equal to matter. There is a very interesting passage in VI. 6 
[34] which suggests that space is posterior to matter in the sense of being 
a by-product of the production of bodies by the soul:
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3) VI. 6 [34] 3. 16-18: “it [this infinity, i.e. matter] does not run away 
[from the idea of limit] from one place to another: for it does not even 
have any place; but when it is caught, place comes into existence” (φεύγει 
δὲ οὐκ εἰς τόπον ἄλλον ἐξ ἑτέρου· οὐ γὰρ οὐδ’ ἔχει τόπον· ἀλλ’ ὅταν ἁλῷ, 
ὑπέστη τόπος). 
Space is posterior to matter and comes into existence when the 
limit of an intelligible form “catches”, delimits the limitless, absolutely 
unqualified matter. Matter was already there, so to speak, so that space 
is hýsteron to matter in the order of production; but, as space implies 
some determination and limit imposed by a form, space is ontologically 
superior to matter. The curious idea here is that we are led to conclude 
that the reality of space – its hýparxis and hypóstasis, as Plotinus refers to 
the reality of time in III. 7 [45] 13. 49 – is a kind of parasite of the body; 
that is, space exists only as the result of the information of matter by the 
sensible along with the other qualities, specially magnitude or extension. 
Contrarily to time, which depends directly on the soul’s activity, space 
depends primarily on bodies, and only secondarily on soul. Space thus can 
be regarded as a unique property of bodies: while all qualities of bodies 
are reflections of intelligible forms – the sensible man is the image of the 
intelligible form of man –, space’s intelligible model is not intelligible 
space, but perhaps the form of extension and magnitude. Could it then 
be said that the soul does not apprehend space, but only bodies and their 
extension, imagining space with them? Would space be the totality of 
bodies’ extensions?
Let us return to Sambursky. As we see, Plotinus does not distinguish 
things so expressly; and I think that he has not eliminated Plato’s asymmetry 
mentioned by Sambursky: rather, what he actually does is to invert the 
asymmetry, so that space is less important for and more distant from the 
soul and the intellect. Definitely there is no symmetry of time and space 
in Plotinus, beginning with the very fact that the perfectly symmetric 
couples mentioned by Sambursky do not exist; as I have already said, 
there is not the intelligible-sensible space couple, and there is not the 
intelligible-sensible time couple as well. An intelligible time cannot be 
tracked in Plotinus as it can be in Iamblichus and Damascius for instance; 
the Plotinian intelligible counterpart of the physical or sensible time is 
eternity, not an intelligible time.11 
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I am not drawing any conclusions from this discussion, but only 
showing that Plotinus’ conception of space is very far from being clear. 
The first and the third passages quoted above do seem to state that 
space is something different from matter –it is not important right now 
whether space exists as something in itself or does not, but only that it is 
something that can be distinguished from matter. And Sambursky is not 
alone in thinking that Plotinus holds that space is different from matter 
– Narbonne endorses his opinion (see note 7 above). But one passage – 
and other scholars – seems, on the other hand, to state that space is to be 
identified with matter:
4) III. 6 [26] 18. 38-43: “it [matter] must then, since it is the place for 
all things, come to all of them itself and meet them and be sufficient for 
every dimension, because it is not itself captured by dimension but lies open 
to that which is going to come to it. How, then, when one particular form 
enters it, does it not hinder the others, which cannot be [present in it] one 
upon another? The answer is that there is no first form, unless perhaps it 
is the form of the universe” (δεῖ τοίνυν πᾶσι τόπον οὖσαν ἐπὶ πάντα αὐτὴν 
ἐλθεῖν καὶ πᾶσιν ἀπαντῆσαι καὶ πρὸς πᾶν διάστημα ἀρκέσαι, ὅτι μὴ κατείληπται 
διαστήματι αὐτή, ἀλλ’ ἦν ἐκκειμένη τῷ μέλλοντι. Πῶς οὖν οὐκ εἰσελθὸν ἕν τι 
ἐκώλυσε τὰ ἄλλα, ἃ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν ἐπ’ ἀλλήλοις εἶναι; Ἢ οὐκ ἦν οὐδὲν πρῶτον· 
εἰ δ’ ἄρα, τὸ τοῦ παντὸς εἶδος).
Calling matter “the place for all things” would be as metaphorical as 
calling the intelligible “the place for all ideas”, if we picture matter as 
somehow sustaining all sensible things, as something below everything 
else which functions as a kind of support for them. This passage, 
nonetheless, suggests that matter is the undefined possibility of bodies’ 
extension, extension itself being one of the intelligible determinations 
that constitute bodies. Here, even though the verbs are not the same, 
there occurs the same image of matter’s capture by form that we read 
in the third passage. But in this fourth passage, differently, the notion of 
space as originated with or after the delimitation of matter by a form 
disappears: Plotinus now states that matter is not captured by dimension 
(maybe “extension” would be a better translation to diástema), while in 
the third passage the limit catches matter and from that space comes to 
be. Since we no more have three elements: matter, form, and space, but 
only two: matter and form, we are led to think that space coincides with 
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matter. There is no first form, says Plotinus, because everything that exists 
in the sensible has been produced and came into existence at the same 
metaphysical, atemporal moment; so if there is a very first form, it is the 
form of all that exists, which would coincide with the totality of space.
But what could we make out of the following curious passage?
5)II. 2 [14] 1. 27-31: “It [the heaven] seeks to go on in a straight line, 
but has no longer any place to go to, so it glides round, we may say, and 
curves back in the regions where it can; for it has no place beyond itself; 
this is the last. So it runs in the space it occupies and is its own place…” (Ἢ 
ἐφιέμενον τοῦ εὐθέος οὐκ ἔχον οὐκέτι τόπον ὥσπερ περιολισθάνον ἀνακάμπτει 
ἐν οἷς τόποις δύναται· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τόπον μεθ’ ἑαυτό· οὗτος γὰρ ἔσχατος. Θεῖ οὖν 
ἐν ᾧ ἔχει καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τόπος…).
One has to acknowledge that this passage alone is a weak evidence 
for the identification of space and matter; yet, it seems to obliquely 
corroborate it. The heavens are the encompassing limits of the sensible 
world, as it seems; therefore they represent the sensible totality that has 
been given form, the other element being matter, which in this case 
seems to be space. This phrase echoes two other phrases in chapter III. 
6 [26] 13, a chapter full of references to Plato’s Timaeus and in which 
Plotinus, under Plato’s influence12, seems to identify hýle, hypodokhé, and 
khóra, apparently taking the latter as a synonym for tópos: “space of the 
forms” (τόπον εἰδῶν), in line 19,a quotation from Plato’s Timaeus 52b 
4-5; and “place of all things” (χώρα πάντων), in line 29.13 It is not easy 
to detect some difference (if there is any) in Plotinus’ use of khóra and 
of tópos, which can occur together in the same phrase, be it literally or 
metaphorically.14 Even though it seems textually weak, the identification 
of space and matter is endorsed by L. P. Gerson (1994, p. 99), for instance, 
who says that “this [condition for the existence of images of intelligible 
forms] is the so-called receptacle or matter or space”.15 
So matter is space and space is other than matter? Yes: if we read carefully 
passages 1), 3) and 4), we will find that Plotinus traces a slight distinction 
between thetópos of 1) and 3), on the one hand, and the tópos of 4), on the 
other. It seems that matter is the space of the possibility of bodies, while 
tópos is space’s intelligible or sensible dimensionality. This would be an 
interesting and important distinction, and I believe it can be held. It should 
be noticed that Plotinus terminology regarding matter is lax: he calls it is 
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khóra and “tópos” as well; the “relative” space, on the other hand, is never 
called khóra, but only tópos. We have therefore two different concepts of 
space until now: an “absolute” space and a “relative” space.
By labeling space “absolute” or “relative”, I am not affirming that 
Plotinus’ notions of space can be unqualifiedly compared with the standard 
concepts of absolute and relative space of Newton16 and Leibniz17, for 
instance. Yet these standard conceptions may give us a clue to Plotinus’. 
Matter is “absolute” space in the sense of being independent of soul. Let 
me correct myself: the truth is that matter in Plotinian metaphysics is not 
independent of soul, just as no lower levels of reality are independent of 
higher ones, and no effect independent of its cause. Yet matter is absolute 
because it is always itself, impassible, unchangeable; it is the space for the 
sensible realm’s emergence, and it is necessary for such emergence. Here 
is another passage in which matter is termed khóra and that seems to 
endorse its sense of “absolute” space:
6) III. 6 [26] 17. 27-30: “individual things acquire magnitude by 
being drawn out by the power of the forms which are visible in matter 
and make a place for themselves, and they are drawn out to everything 
without violence because the universe exists by matter” (μεγεθύνεται δὲ 
ἕκαστα ἑλκόμενα τῇ δυνάμει τῶν ἐνορωμένων καὶ χώραν ἑαυτοῖς ποιούντων, 
ἕλκεται δὲ ἐπὶ πάντα οὐ βίᾳ τῷ ὕλῃ τὸ πᾶν εἶναι).
This passage should be read together with II. 4 [12] 11, in which 
Plotinus says that matter, though without size, is receptive of all size and 
of all extension. It is the matter of mass that, “so to speak, runs through 
the whole range of mass”; but it is itself nothing but a “phantom of 
mass”. So matter is the “absolute”, changeless space underneath all size-
determinations. Such illusion of size and extension might be the space 
perceived by soul or by the senses, which is something different from 
matter itself. This other, “relative”, space thus is relative in the sense of 
being relative to or one of the determinations of bodies. The status of 
“relative” space in Plotinus’ thought is not clear, though. Passages 1) and 
3) above are not enough to state whether space subsists by itself and, if it 
does, whether its subsistence is similar to time’s subsistence, which is not 
a reality in itself but is real for the soul’s products, which are said to be “in 
time”. The sensible is also said to be “in space”, but I am not sure whether 
this could also be interpreted as “in matter” or not.
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III
If we had any certainty about Plotinus’ concept (or concepts) of space, it 
ends here. We can conclude with moderate assurance, therefore, that there 
is one notion of space in Plotinus’ philosophy that coincides with matter, 
and that there is other notion of space that does not coincides with 
matter, but seems to be some sort of by-product of the information of 
matter by the soul. What this second notion exactly is, I think it difficult 
to be sure. Let us read, from now on, several passages from the Enneads 
that contain assertions regarding space as apparently different from matter 
that are difficult to assess:
7) IV. 4 [28] 15. 17-20: “For the souls are eternal, and time is posterior to 
them, and that which is in time is less than time; for time must encompass 
what is in time, as is the case, Aristotle says [Physics, 4. 12, 221a18 and 28-
30], with what is in place and number” (Ἀίδιοι γὰρ αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ ὁ χρόνος 
ὕστερος, καὶ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ ἔλαττον χρόνου· περιέχειν γὰρ δεῖ τὸν χρόνον τὸ ἐν 
χρόνῳ, ὥσπερ, φησί, τὸ ἐν τόπῳ καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ). Cf. VI. 1 [42] 14. 19-20.
This passage introduces the somewhat natural, but in Plotinus puzzling, 
comparison between time and space: that which is in time and in space is 
not only posterior to time and to space, but it is also “less” than them. In 
time’s case, this statement is not surprising, for time is the soul’s activity, 
so that the sensible, which is the product of soul, has necessarily to be 
posterior and inferior to the soul’s activity. But what sense does it make 
to say that the sensible is posterior and inferior to space?
The sensible may be said posterior to space if we take space to 
be the same as matter. In this case, the sensible may be said to be 
posterior to matter, because it originates from form and matter, which 
comes logically before the body. But can the sensible be said to be 
ontologically inferior to space? As we have seen when considering the 
space as something other than matter, space comes into existence after 
bodies, and its reality, if it has any, seems to depend upon bodies, so that 
if there were not bodies, and no form ruling over matter, there would 
not be space. The way Plotinus speaks of space in the this seventh 
passage makes us think of space as one of the frames of the sensible, 
along with time, both pertaining and proceeding more properly from 
the soul’s activity.
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It not unusual that Plotinus speaks of space in Aristotelian terms as that 
which encompasses bodies, suggesting that it is superior to and different 
from them. The following three passages, in which Plotinus speaks of 
space only incidentally when discussing related topics, exhibit signs 
implying that space has a certain kind of reality and that it can be thought 
of as parallel to time. The context of passage 8) is the soul’s immateriality 
and, consequently, that it is not in the body as in a place. Plotinus clearly 
reveals there that he conceives space (one space, at least) as not related to 
body, apparently in the sense that it is not delimited by a form or that it 
is not a compound of form and matter. It is not easy to understand what 
the difference between matter and space is in this passage, though; a body 
is a compound of form and matter, and space encompasses the body, 
not taking part in its composition: but, being bodiless, what would then 
be nature of space’s reality? Would it be intelligible? Passages 9) and 10) 
concern Plotinus’ criticism of the Aristotelian and Stoic categories (as he 
understands them), and the formulation of Plotinus’ own categories for 
the sensible world. They apparently deny the idea of a space endowed 
with defined magnitude and direction; the position occupied by a body, 
therefore, can be described only in relation to other bodies and in relation 
to the observer; so space itself seems to have nothing to do with position, 
coming close to the modern notion of a homogeneous space (I italicize 
the important phrases):
8) IV. 3. [27] 20. 12-14 and 19-20: “For place is something encompassing, 
and encompassing body, and where each divided part is, there it is [and 
nowhere else] so that the whole is not [as a whole] in any place …But 
place in the strict and proper sense is bodiless and not a body: so what need 
would it have of soul? (περιεκτικὸν μὲν γὰρ ὁ τόπος καὶ περιεκτικὸν σώματος, 
καὶοὗ ἕκαστον μερισθέν ἐστιν, ἔστιν ἐκεῖ, ὡς μὴ ὅλον ἐν ὁτῳοῦν εἶνα… Ὁ δὲ 
τόπος ὁ κυρίως ἀσώματος καὶ οὐ σῶμα· ὥστε τί ἂν δέοιτο ψυχῆς;).
9) VI. 3 [44] 12. 19-25: “In these respects [i.e. that the póson can indicate 
more or less of the same poîon, so that one thing can be, for instance, 
hotter than the other], then, there is an opposition in the quantitative; 
for there is no longer one [i.e. opposition] in place, because place does not belong 
to the quantitative; since, even if place did belong to the quantitative, ‘up’ would 
not be opposite to anything, since there is no ‘down’ in the All. But when ‘up’ 
and ‘down’ are spoken of in the parts, they could not mean anything else 
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but ‘higher up’ and ‘lower down’ and are like ‘right’ and ‘left’; and these 
belong to the relatives” (Ἐναντιότης τοίνυν κατὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ποσόν· κατὰ 
γὰρ τὸν τόπον οὐκέτι, ὅτι μὴ τοῦ ποσοῦ· ἐπεὶ καί, εἰ τοῦ ποσοῦ ἦν ὁ τόπος, οὐκ 
ἦν ἐναντίον τὸ ἄνω τινὶ μὴ ὄντος τοῦ κάτω ἐν τῷ παντί. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ 
ἄνω καὶ κάτω λεγόμενον ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἂν σημαίνοι ἢ ἀνωτέρω καὶ κατωτέρω καὶ 
ὅμοιον τῷ «δεξιὸν» καὶ «ἀριςτερόν»· ταῦτα δὲ τῶν πρός τι).
10) VI. 1 [42] 4. 11-17: “But a line and a surface and a body are not 
even called quanta, but are called magnitudes but not quanta, granted 
that they receive the additional appellation of quanta when they are 
brought to a number, two cubits or three cubits: since the natural body 
also becomes a quantum when it is measured, and place is so incidentally, not 
in so far it is place. But one must not take what is incidentally a quantum, 
but the quantitative in itself, like quantity” (ἀλλὰ γραμμή γε καὶ ἐπίπεδον 
καὶ σῶμα οὐδὲ λέγεται, ἀλλὰ μεγέθη μὲν λέγεται, ποσὰ δὲ οὐ λέγεται, εἴπερ τότε 
προςλαμβάνει τὸ ποσὸν λέγεσθαι, ὅταν εἰς ἀριθμὸν ἀχθῇ δίπηχυ ἢ τρίπηχυ· 
ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τὸ φυσικὸν μετρηθὲν γίγνεται ποσόν τι, καὶ ὁ τόπος κατὰ 
συμβεβηκός, οὐχ ᾗ τόπος. Δεῖ δὲ μὴ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ποσὸν λαμβάνειν, 
ἀλλὰ τὸ καθ’ αὑτό, οἷον ποσότητα)18.
Sometimes, however, “relative” space (i.e. the space that is not matter) 
seems to have a dubious reality, being only a category for the analysis of the 
sensible or a kind of delirium of soul. Plotinus is never clear as Theophrastus19 
in stating that space is unreal, but these texts are very suggestive:
11) VI. 3 [44] 5. 29-35: [Opposing to Aristotle’s statement that “not 
being in a substrate is proper to all that is substance” (Categories 5. 3a7-
8)]: “But time is not in a substrate either, nor is place. But if “the measure of 
movement” is understood as applying to what is measured, the measure 
will exist in the movement as in a substrate, and the movement in what is 
moved; but if it is taken as referring to the measurer, then the measure will 
be in the measurer. And place, being the ‘boundary of that which encompasses’, 
is in it” (Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὁ χρόνος ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, οὐδ’ ὁ τόπος. Ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν τὸ μέτρον 
λαμβάνεται κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ μεμετρημένον, τὸ μέτρον ἐν τῇ κινήσει ὑπάρξει ὡς 
ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, ἥ τε κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ· εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ μετροῦν λαμβάνεται, ἐν 
τῷ μετροῦντι ἔσται τὸ μέτρον. Ὁ δὲτόπος, πέρας τοῦ περιέχοντος ὤν, ἐν ἐκείνῳ).
12) VI. 1 [42] 28. 6-13: “For they [the Stoics] considered that bodies 
were the real beings, and, since they were afraid of their transformation 
into each other, they thought that what persisted under them was reality, 
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as if someone thought that place rather than bodies was real being, considering that 
place does not perish. Yet place also does persist for them, but they ought not to have 
considered that what persists in any kind of way was real being, but to see first 
what characteristics must belong to what is truly real, on the existence 
of which persistence for ever depends” (Τὰ γὰρ σώματα νομίσαντες εἶναι τὰ 
ὄντα, εἶτα αὐτῶν τὴν μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλληλα φοβηθέντες τὸ μένον ὑπ’ αὐτὰ τοῦτο 
ᾠήθησαν τὸ ὂν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις μᾶλλον τὸν τόπον ἢ τὰ σώματα νομίσειεν 
εἶναι τὸ ὄν, ὅτι οὐ φθείρεται ὁ τόπος νομίσας.Καίτοι καὶ οὗτος αὐτοῖς μένει, ἔδει 
δὲ οὐ τὸ ὁπωσοῦν μένον νομίσαι τὸ ὄν, ἀλλὰ ἰδεῖν πρότερον, τίνα δεῖ προσεῖναι 
τῷ ἀληθῶς ὄντι, οἷς οὖσιν ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ μένειν).
None of the passages states that space is unreal, this is certain. But 
their denial is very telling; maybe not “very”, but moderately telling. 
Passage 11) is extremely cryptic, yet it somehow may be interpreted as 
follows: time and space are not in a substrate (this phrase probably is a 
kind of intervention of Plotinus’ mental interlocutor, but it is not an 
objection); Plotinus replies that it depends on whether we attribute the 
measure to what is measuring or to what is being measure; as it seems, 
time and space can be used as measures (though we know from III. 7 
[45], especially chapter 9, that time itself is not a measure, so that we 
deduce space is not either). So far, so good. But the phrase “ὁ δὲτόπος, 
πέρας τοῦ περιέχοντος ὤν, ἐν ἐκείνῳ” messes up the reasoning: Plotinus 
explains that time and space are not in a substrate, and yet are not ousíai; 
the “measure of movement” is Aristotle’s definition of time, and it is not 
in the movement as in a substrate; knowing Plotinus’ theory of time, 
we could say that time is in the soul, that is, if it has to be somewhere, 
it is more in the measurer (apparently not as in a substrate) than in the 
measured. Space, however, assuming that it is the limit of that which 
encompasses the body, and assuming that it not an essence, is in it: but 
what is “it”?If “it” refers to the body, it could be said that space is in 
body as a substrate, but this would be false for Plotinus. Would “it” be the 
contour of body? I am not sure; wouldn’t this mean that space still has 
body as a kind of substrate? Or would Plotinus be misquoting Aristotle 
here, so that, if we understand the participle tò periékhon as properly active 
and transitive, we would take it to refer to the being that encompasses 
bodies, i.e. soul? Could “in it” also mean “in the measurer”, not in it as 
in a substrate, but in it as an active capacity of measuring? Then space 
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would, just as time, have a certain kind of reality (hýparxis and hypóstasis 
in Plotinus’ words), without being an essence.
In passage 12), Plotinus criticizes the Stoics because they thought that 
what persists is that which is real, and gives the example of space. He 
thinks that the Stoics held that bodies are the real being, but, seeing that 
they change and perish, they concluded that the underlying subsistent 
is what is real, just as if someone were to say that space is the real being 
because it does not perish – i.e. although space does not perish, it is not 
real being. Then comes the remarkable adversative clause: “Yet place also 
does persist for them, but they ought not to have considered that what 
persists in any kind of way was real being”. This sounds almost like “but 
those maniacs even thought that space persist; they should not think that 
any miserable thing that persists in any kind of way is real”. Following 
Plotinus’ argument here, the single fact that something persists does not 
necessarily makes it a real being; space may even persist in a way, but not 
as tò ón. This, the real being, for Plotinus, is the intelligible, the forms; 
and, the passage suggests, space is not an intelligible. His argumentation, 
however, suggests that he does not agree with anything the Stoics said, for 
he makes it sound absurd that someone can think that space is more real 
than bodies, even though it somehow subsists, while bodies do not. As it 
seems, Plotinus thinks that bodies are more real than space, or at least that 
space’s subsistence is dependent on bodies somehow.
IV
Plotinus’ notions of space we have seen until now are related to the sensible 
world; whether we take space as matter, or as something related to bodies, 
or the (corporeal) form of the universe, space is time’s counterpart as the 
encompassing determinations of the sensible realm.
The third notion of space in Plotinus, however, can be seen as the de-
materialization of space’s concept. The importance of the encompassing 
character of space is amplified to its ultimate metaphysical consequences: 
since the corporeal is the degraded image of the incorporeal, the sensible 
world must be dependent on the real, primordial, causes of reality. The 
idea that space encompasses the body gives place to the idea that soul 
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encompasses body in an immaterial way. And it does not stop there: each 
level of reality is encompassed by the level “above” it: body by soul, soul 
by intellect, intellect by the one.
Plotinus is not the first thinker to propose such an idea.20 The 
conception comes from the Stoic philosophers who considered space 
to be the limit of the totality of bodies, the material universe.21 Along 
with this notion, some Stoics, namely Chrysippus, said the universe is 
God.22 Space, i.e. God, and the universe, therefore, are the same material 
encompassing reality. This concept was certainly known to Plotinus, who 
also certainly despised it. This very idea is not absent from Plotinus, as we 
can see in passages 4) and 5) above, in which Plotinus speaks of a form 
of the universe and of the heaven as not having other (physical) space 
beyond itself.
The notion of space as the whole material universe can also be 
tracked in the Neopythagorean philosopher Pseudo-Archytas,23 whose 
opinions Plotinus perhaps also knew, with the important addition of the 
fundamental priority of space to all other things.24 Another important 
stage of this concept of space are the Jewish and Christian exegetical 
writers, who interpreted passages from the Old and New Testaments 
which described God as space in an spiritual way. Philo’s summary 
of the three senses of space is paradigmatic, the third of them being: 
“God Himself is called place, for He encompasses all things, but is not 
encompassed by anything.”25 
With the exception of this impressing passage (which must not be 
taken literally as stating that body is soul’s place, since Plotinus warns us 
some lines earlier that he is employing improper terms “for the sake of 
clear exposition”) –
13) IV. 3 [27] 9. 20-23: “For the truth is as follows. If body did not 
exist, soul would not go forth, since there is no place other than body 
where it is natural for it to be. But if it intends to go forth, it will produce 
a place for itself, and so a body” (Ἐπεὶ τό γε ἀληθὲς ὧδε ἔχει· σώματος μὲν 
μὴ ὄντος οὐδ’ ἂν προέλθοι ψυχή, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τόπος ἄλλος ἐστίν, ὅπου πέφυκεν 
εἶναι. Προιέναι δὲ εἰ μέλλοι, γεννήσει ἑαυτῇ τόπον, ὥστε καὶ σῶμα).
– there are numerous others that present the clear statement that soul 
is not in body, and that the immaterial is not in the material, but rather 
the opposite. Let us read three passages:
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14) III. 7 [45] 11. 33-35: “For since the world of sense moves in Soul 
– there is no place for it than Soul – it moves also in the time of Soul.” 
(ἐν ἐκείνῃ γὰρ κινούμενος – οὐ γάρ τις αὐτοῦ τόπος ἢ ψυχή – καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐκείνης 
αὖ ἐκινεῖτο χρόνῳ).
15) IV. 3 [27] 20. 10-15: “Now we must say in general that neither any 
of the parts of the soul nor the whole soul are in body as a place. For place 
is something encompassing, and encompassing body, and where each 
divided part is, there it [soul] is, so that the whole is not in any place; but 
soul is not in a body, and is no more encompassed than encompassing” 
(Ὅλως μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν οὐδὲ πᾶσαν φατέον ὡς ἐν τόπῳ 
εἶναι τῷ σώματι· περιεκτικὸν μὲν γὰρ ὁ τόπος καὶ περιεκτικὸν σώματος, καὶ οὗ 
ἕκαστον μερισθέν ἐστιν, ἔστιν ἐκεῖ, ὡς μὴ ὅλον ἐν ὁτῳοῦν εἶναι· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οὐ 
σῶμα, καὶ οὐ περιεχόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ περιέχον).
16) V. 5 [32] 9. 26-35: “Observe the universe also, that, since there is 
no universe before it, it is not itself in a universe, nor again in place: for 
what place could there be before a universe existed? But its parts are 
dependent on it and in it. But Soul is not in the universe, but the universe 
in it: for body is not the soul’s place, but Soul is in Intellect and body 
in Soul, and Intellect in something else; but there is nothing other than 
this [i.e. the One] for it to be in: it is not, then, in anything; in this way 
therefore, it is nowhere. Where then are the other things? In it. It has not, 
then, gone away from all other things, nor is God himself with them, but 
it possesses everything” (Ὅρα δὲ καὶ τὸν κόσμον, ὅτι, ἐπεὶ μηδεὶς κόσμος πρὸ 
αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἐν κόσμῳ αὐτὸς οὐδ’ αὖ ἐν τόπῳ· τίς γὰρ τόπος πρὶν κόσμον εἶναι; 
Τὰ δὲ μέρη ἀνηρτημένα εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ. Ψυχὴ δὲ οὐκ ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ’ 
ἐκεῖνος ἐν αὐτῇ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τόπος τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ ψυχὴ μὲν ἐν νῷ, σῶμα 
δὲ ἐν ψυχῇ, νοῦς δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ· τούτου δὲ οὐκέτι ἄλλο, ἵν’ ἂν ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ· οὐκ ἐν 
ὁτῳοῦν ἄρα· ταύτῃ οὖν οὐδαμῇ. Ποῦ οὖν τὰ ἄλλα; ἐν αὐτῷ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀφέστηκε 
τῶν ἄλλων οὔτε αὐτὸς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐστιν οὐδὲ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἔχον αὐτό, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ 
ἔχει τὰ πάντα).
V
Our objective in this article was to collect and present relevant passages 
from Plotinus’ Enneads regarding the concepts of space that figure in 
doispontos, Curitiba, São Carlos, vol. 10, n. 2, p.33-54, outubro, 2013
49
them. By way of conclusion, we may say that – although I acknowledge 
that further commentary on the passages here presented would still be 
required, in order to substantiate mythesis – there are three notions of 
space in Plotinus’s writings: i) matter is tópos and khóra, the underlying 
ground for the apparition of bodies and the sensible realm; ii) tópos, but 
never khóra, is the space in connection to bodies and the sensible universe; 
iii) the principle is the place for that which comes from it. Notions i) 
and iii) are fairly clear and adjusted to Plotinus’ philosophy. Notion ii), 
however, is not; Plotinus does not seem to hold only one, and coherent, 
notion for this concept of space: it appears in the Enneads as inferior to 
bodies and also as superior to them, as real and also as unreal, as dependent 
on bodies and also as independent from them, as the totality of the sensible 
universe and also as the projection of extension which soul creates when 
perceiving bodies.
Notion i) seems to rely on Plato’s Timaeus, being original in so far as 
Plotinus’ concept of matter is original, but not for the concept of space 
itself. Notion ii) seems related to Aristotle, Theophrastus, and the Stoics, 
presenting little originality in its possibilities. Notion iii) seems influenced 
by the Stoics and Neopythagoreans, but in a dematerialized version; it is 
impossible to decide whether Plotinus knew Philo’s text, but the latter’s 
interpretation of God as space is strikingly similar to Plotinus’ third 
notion of space; it is original to the extent that it is perfectly reworked 
and adjusted to Plotinus’ own hypostatic scheme.
As we have also seen, scholars’ opinions differ as to which of these 
three is Plotinus’ concept of space; and they usually present only one of 
these three notions, neglecting the concurrence of the others.
There is one fundamental question to be put after this somewhat 
frustrating investigation of the concept of space in Plotinus’ philosophy: 
why Plotinus does not give to space the same attention he gives to time? 
Why is time more important than space for Plotinus? I do not have an 
answer for it yet, nor will try to speculate now.
Anyway, if we understand space as notions i) and iii), this question does 
not make sense; for, as much as he could, Plotinus has meditated upon 
matter and upon the hypostatic relations. But if we understand space as 
notion ii), we are perplexed. One cannot cease to wonder why so profound 
a philosopher as Plotinus has not investigated one of the fundamental 
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aspects of the sensible reality, especially when he has investigated time, 
space’s customary philosophical partner. It may be said that the sensible 
did not concern Plotinus very much, but that is not wholly true either.
1 Though there may be differences between the concepts of “place” and “space”, for brevity’s 
sake I will be frequently using only the word “space” instead of repeating each time “space or 
place”, “space and place”. The Greek word I primarily have in mind when discussing concepts 
of space is tópos; when khóra is the term discussed, I will make it clear.
2 Cf. V. 1 [10] 4 and IV. 4 [28] 15-16.
3 BARACAT, 2013, p. 34.
4 JAMMER, 1993; SORABJI, 1988; SAMBURSKY, 1982. INGE (1918, volume I, p. 163-
164) has written some of the most interesting pages on concept of space in Plotinus, but I 
am not quite sure whether all that he says can be found in the Plotinus’ texts. He seems to 
understand tópos primarily as “extension”, rather than as “space” or “place”, and, as far as I can 
see, he makes no distinction between these concepts. He says, for instance, that “the ground-
-form of all appearance is Extension (tópos)”; that “if Space were real, externality would be 
an ultimate fact, for space is the form of externality”; and that “the space which we think of 
as containing the physical order is conceptual, not perceptual” – and quotes only IV. 2 [4] in 
order to substantiate it. I wish I had found such assertions there, but unfortunately I have not.
5 For a more detailed analysis of the concept of space in Plato, cf. ALGRA, 1995, p. 72-120, 
and the references there given.
6 All translations of the Enneads are ARMSTRONG’s (1966-1988), sometimes slightly mo-
dified; the Greek text is that of the editio minor of HENRY and SCHWYZER (1964-1982).
7 Cf. NARBONNE (1993, p. 334-5), who thinks that such doctrine, which is the beginning 
of a progressive “de-realization” of place that is important in the post-Plotinian Neoplatonism, 
is of capital importance for Plotinus’ metaphysics, being a novelty in relation both to Plato 
and to Aristotle.
8 Cf. CASEY (1998, p. 88-89, 91, 288, 333), who relies on Sambursky’s selection and sees 
Plotinus as the founder of a non-sensible notion of space, the “intelligible place”. Strictly spe-
aking, however, “there is not any place in the intelligible world” (VI. 2 [43] 16. 4).
9 This place could be interpreted as the very intelligible totality, but I think Plotinus uses the 
word metaphorically here and elsewhere, when applied to the noetic world. I cannot see how 
this and other passages can be read as to suggest that such intelligible place is some sort of 
model for the sensible place. Cf.: I. 3 [20] 1. 16; I. 6 [1] 9. 41; IV. 3 [27] 32. 26; V. 9 [5] 2. 1 – see 
SLEEMAN and POLLET, 1980, sub voc. b).
10 The adjective hýsteron seems to have confused some other great scholars too: HELM (1981, 
p. 237), for instance, despite his profound analysis of the concept of time in Plotinus, believes 
that “Plotinus makes four main points in dealing with time in relation to space”, three of 
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which seem hard to sustain for me. The second point is that space is “dependent and subser-
vient to time”, that “space is after everything else [Helm here refers to INGE, volume I, 1918, 
p. 163-14, who says only that space is “later” than matter; see note 4 above]”, and that “space 
is brought under time and is inferior to time”. Statements like these do not find fundament 
in Plotinus’ texts.
11 Cf. GERSON (1994, pp. 233-234, n. 58), who also asserts that there is in Plotinus a prio-
rity of time to space; Gerson also objects to the idea of an “atemporal duration” in Plotinus’ 
thought formulated by STUMP and KRETZMANN (1981, pp. 444-445), which would be 
similar to the idea of an “intelligible time”.
12 I am not concerned with the question whether Plato himself made such identification or 
not, but only with the fact that Plotinus seems to do and that he very probably believes that 
Plato did it; Plotinus is not fully aware, as we are nowadays, that Aristotle (Physics, IV, 2, 209b 
11-16) ascribes this theory to Plato’s unwritten doctrines, and that the concept of “matter” is 
much more Aristotelian than Platonic.
13 Cf. also III. 6 [26] 17. 13, where Plotinus says that the forms entering matter make a khóra 
for things.
14 Cf. IV. 5 [29] 2. 13; V. 8 [31] 3. 36; VI. 5 [23] 3. 14; VI. 8 [39] 11. 15.
15 Gerson does not quote any passage to illustrate it in the context, but a few pages earlier 
(p. 96) he had referred to III. 6 [26] 13. 19, and in note 16(which is on p. 230), he says: “in 
III.6.13.19 Plotinus quotes Timaeus 52a8–b1, where Plato identifies the receptacle as khóra. So, 
when Plotinus further identifies the receptacle as matter, he seems to be endorsing Aristotle’s 
interpretation of matter as space”.
16 Principia, Scholium V: “Spatium absolutum natura sua absque relatione ad externum quoduis 
semper manet similare & immobile”.
17 Third Letter to Clarke, 4: “As for my own opinion, I have said more than once that I hold 
space to be something purely relative, as time is – that I hold it to be an order of coexistences, 
as time is an order of successions. For space denotes, in terms of possibility, an order of things 
that exist at the same time, considered as existing together, without entering into their parti-
cular manners of existing. And when many things are seen together, one consciously perceives 
this order of things among themselves.”
18 Cf. VI. 1 [42] 14. 2-3: “Now Academy and Lyceum are in every senses places, and parts of 
place, just as the “above” and the “here” are species or parts of place” (Ἡ μὲν οὖν Ἀκαδημία καὶ τὸ 
Λύκιον πάντως τόποι καὶ μέρη τόπου, ὥσπερ τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω καὶ τὸ ὡδὶ εἴδη ἢ μέρη).
19 Theophrastus (Simplicius, In. Phys., 639, 15-22 Diels, quoted and translated by 
SAMBURSKY, 1982, p. 32-33): “Perhaps place is not a reality in itself, but is defined by the 
arrangement and position of bodies in respect to their natures and powers, as is the case with 
animals and plants and in general with those non homogeneous bodies which, whether ani-
mate or inanimate, have a nature endowed with form. For in these bodies there is a certain 
arrangement and position of the parts in respect of the substance as a whole. Thus each is said 
to be in its own place through the existence of the proper arrangement, especially as every 
part of a body is desirous of, and strives after, occupying its own place and position” (“μήποτε 
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οὐκ ἔστι καθ’αὑτὸν οὐσία τις τόπος, ἀλλὰ τῇ τάξει καὶ θέσει τῶν σωμάτων λέγεται κατὰ τὰς φύσεις 
καὶ δυνάμεις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ ὅλως τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν εἴτε ἐμψύχων εἴτε 
ἀψύχων, ἔμμορφον δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἐχόντων. καὶ γὰρ τούτων τάξις τις καὶ θέσις τῶν μερῶν ἐστι πρὸς 
τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν. διὸ καὶ ἕκαστον ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ χώρᾳ λέγεται τῷ ἔχειν τὴν οἰκείαν τάξιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν τοῦ 
σώματος μερῶν ἕκαστον ἐπιποθήσειεν ἂν καὶ ἀπαιτήσειε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χώραν καὶ θέσιν”).
20 The evolution and dematerialization of this notion of space is well and briefly presented by 
SAMBURSKY (1982, p. 13-15).
21 Cf. e.g. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta,vol. II, 504, 505, 507.
 
22 S.V.F., vol. II, 527.
23 PSEUDO-ARCHYTAS (= SIMPLICIUS, In Categ. 363, 22-27 Kalbfleisch, quoted and 
translated by SAMBURSKY, 1982, pp. 36-37): “It is peculiar to place that while other things 
are in it, place is in nothing. For if it were in some place, this place again will be in another 
place, and this will go on without end. For this very reason it is necessary for other things to 
be in place, but for place to be in nothing. And so for the things that exist there always holds 
the relation of the limits to the things limited, for the place of the whole cosmos is the limit of 
all existing things” (“τῶ δὲ τόπω ἴδιόν ἐστιν τὸ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐν αὐτῷ ἦμεν, αὐτὸν δὲ ἐν μηδενί. εἰ γὰρ 
ἔν τινι τόπῳ, ἔσται καὶ ὁ τόπος πάλιν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑτέρῳ, καὶ τοῦτο μέχρι ἀπείρω συμβασεῖται. ἀνάγκα 
τοιγαροῦν τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐν τόπῳ ἦμεν, τὸν δὲ τόπον ἐν μηδενί, ἀλλ’ οὕτως ἔχεν πὸτ τὰ ὄντα ὥσπερ καὶ 
τὰ πέρατα πρὸς τὰ περατούμενα· ὁ γὰρ τῶ παντὸς κόσμω τόπος πέρας ἁπάντων τῶν ὄντων ἐστίν”).
24 PSEUDO-ARCHYTAS (= SIMPLICIUS, In Categ. 361, 21-24 Kalbfleisch, quoted and 
translated by SAMBURSKY, 1982, pp. 36-37): “Since everything that is in motion is moved 
in some place, it is obvious that one has to grant priority to place, in which that which cau-
ses motion or is acted upon will be. Perhaps thus it is the first of all things, since all existing 
things are either in place or not without place” (“ἐπεὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ κινεόμενον ἐν τόπῳ τινὶ κινεῖται, 
φανερὸν ὅτι τόπον ὑπῆμεν δεῖ πρότερον, ἐν ᾧπερ ἐσσεῖται τὸ κινέον ἢ τὸ πάσχον. ἴσως δὲ τᾷ καὶ 
πρᾶτον τοῦτο ἁπάντων, ἐπειδήπερ τὰ ὄντα πάντα ἤτοι ἐν τόπῳ ἐντὶ ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ τόπω”).
25 PHILO, On Dreams, 1. 61. 3-64.4 (translated by COLSON and WHITAKER, 1934, p. 329): 
“Now ‘place’ has a threefold meaning, firstly that of a space filled by a material form, secondly 
that of the Divine Word, which God Himself has completely filled throughout with incorpo-
real potencies ; for ‘they saw,’ says Moses, ‘the place where the God of Israel stood’ (Ex. xxiv. 
10) Only in this place did he permit them to sacrifice, forbidding them to do so elsewhere: 
for they were expressly bidden to go up ‘to the place which the Lord God shall choose’ (Deut. 
xii. 5), and there to sacrifice ‘the whole burnt offerings and the peace offerings’ (Ex. xx. 24) 
and to offer the other pure sacrifices. There is a third signification, in keeping with which 
God Himself is called a place, by reason of His containing things, and being contained by 
nothing whatever, and being a place for all to flee into, and because He is Himself the space 
which holds Him; for He is that which He Himself has occupied, and naught encloses Him 
but Himself. I, mark you, am not a place, but in a place; and each thing likewise that exists ; 
for that which is contained is different from that which contains it, and the Deity, being con-
tained by nothing, is of necessity Itself Its own place” (λέγεται γάρ, ὅτι “ἀπήντησε τόπῳ” (Gen. 
28, 11). τριχῶς δὲ ἐπινοεῖται τόπος, ἅπαξ μὲν χώρα ὑπὸ σώματος πεπληρωμένη, κατὰ δεύτερον δὲ 
τρόπον ὁ θεῖος λόγος, ὃν ἐκπεπλήρωκεν ὅλον δι’ ὅλων ἀσωμάτοις δυνάμεσιν αὐτὸς ὁ θεός. “εἶδον” 
γάρ φησι “τὸν τόπον οὗ εἱστήκει ὁ θεὸς τοῦ Ἰσραήλ” (Exod. 1.62.5 24, 10), ἐν ᾧ μόνῳ καὶ ἱερουργεῖν 
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ἐφῆκεν ἀλλαχόθι κωλύσας· διείρηται γὰρ ἀναβαίνειν εἰς τὸν τόπον, ὃν ἂν ἐκλέξηται κύριος ὁ θεός, 
κἀκεῖ θύειν τὰ ὁλοκαυτώματα καὶ τὰ σωτήρια καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀμώμους θυσίας ἀνάγειν (Deut. 12, 5 
ss.). κατὰ δὲ τρίτον σημαινόμενον αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς καλεῖται τόπος τῷ περιέχειν μὲν τὰ ὅλα, περιέχεσθαι 
δὲ πρὸς μηδενὸς ἁπλῶς, καὶ τῷ καταφυγὴν τῶν συμπάντων αὐτὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἐπειδήπερ αὐτός ἐστι 
χώρα ἑαυτοῦ, κεχωρηκὼς ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἐμφερόμενος μόνῳ ἑαυτῷ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὔκ εἰμι τόπος, ἀλλ’ ἐν 
τόπῳ, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ὁμοίως· τὸ γὰρ περιεχόμενον διαφέρει τοῦ περιέχοντος, τὸ δὲ θεῖον ὑπ’ 
οὐδενὸς περιεχόμενον ἀναγκαίως ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τόπος ἑαυτοῦ.
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